Has Warfare changed that much?
The study of military history is an essential element in training for command - not that it will necessarily tell you what you should, or should not do in a particular situation, but it will give you a better understanding of the conduct of war, its attendant pressures, how commanders in the past have fallen prey to their fears, and how they have or have not employed the Principles of War. However to be able to understand military history you must first understand the language of war.
It has become an established practice in recent times to rewrite history to suit modern social parameters and to even rewrite the art of war in a new language suggesting somehow that everything about war has changed. But has it, or is it just putting new labels on old wine? Of course if the wine is good but you're having trouble marketing it, then perhaps new labels will help the sales effort.
This is not to suggest that warfare has not changed, or even to argue in what way and by how much, (I will leave that to you) but instead I ask whether such obfuscation could be, as Petronious Arbiter suggested over two thousand years ago: 'a wonderful method for creating an illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation'.
So let us first answer the question; What is War? Sun Tzu suggested that 'war is a matter of vital importance to the State; a matter of life or death, the road either to survival or ruin', while Clausewitz said 'Warfare therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will ...[and that] ... war is a mere continuation of policy by other means'. To the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English war is simply 'armed hostilities between nations; conflict'.
I am quite happy to accept that these three adequately define war, but it doesn't stop there. Toffler`s Wave War Theory submits that there has been three 'Wave Forms of Warfare'; Agrarian, Industrial and now Infotech, where the aim is 'To deny the enemy the ability to fight a war by denying him C4I - command, control, communications, computers and intelligence'. Which appears to be the same as 1000 years before computers - kill the King and you denied the enemy command, control and intelligence. The target may be different but the aim was the same.
The next step in our considerations is the Levels of War. Once we had Grand Strategy which was defined as ' .... strategic concepts at a level above single theatre and campaign strategy, and comprising a mixture of military and national strategy' [Dictionary of Military Terms]; or, as the Canadians put it in their 'The Army[Interim] 1984' that it is 'in part synonymous with national strategy ..... in part synonymous with allied military strategy ... [and]... military strategy is a component of grand strategy'. Sun Tzu`s grand strategy was 'To subdue the enemy without fighting'.
But has Grand Strategy been replaced by Strategy as defined in ADFP 101 as 'The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support for policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favourable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat', and that the Strategic Level of War 'is concerned with the art and science of employing national power' [JSP(AS)101]. I think it has, for The Fundamentals of Land Warfare [1985] says that Grand Strategy applies only to alliances of nations with mutual interest.
Then we had Strategy which Hilaire Belloc said 'is concerned with bringing armies into action in a fashion best calculated to give them advantage', and which Clausewitz called 'The theory of the use of combats for the object of war'. This was the second level of war, which we now call the Operational Level of War. Operations is defined by JSP (AS)101 as 'A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, training or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign'. This level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns and there appears to be a marked similarity between the old Strategy and Operations.
The third level, the Tactical Level of War, appears to be the only constant in our universe. Clausewitz called Tactics 'The theory of the use of military forces in combat', Sun Tzu said it was 'The art of using troops', while JSP (AS)101 defines it as 'The employment of units in contact', and that 'The tactical level of war is characterised by the application of concentrated force to gain objectives'.
Let us now look at the Theory of Warfare. Over two thousand years ago Sun Tzu said 'Now war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces. ....[for] .... when torrential water tosses boulders it is because of its momentum; when the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing. Thus, the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely timed'. In the 13th Century Genghis Khan’s theory was based on intelligence, surprise, mobility [manoeuvre] and firepower, and '..... the widest latitude was given to each subordinate commander in accomplishing the specific objective assigned to him. Prior to a general engagement a commander of a touman [1000 men] was at liberty to manoeuvre to meet the enemy at his discretion' [Encyclopaedia of Military History
A few hundred years later in 1982, the United States Army developed a doctrine called Airland Battle 2000. The fundamental principles of this Theory of War were decentralised decision making, faster reaction, greater depth of battlefield and time and synchronisation. In it they discuss manoeuvre. 'Manoeuvre is the dynamic element of combat. The means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain and to use the advantage of surprise, psychological shock, position and momentum which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones'; and, 'Offensive manoeuvre suggests that envelopment is the best method because it avoids the enemy’s main strength and produces the greatest physical shock. A turning movement is a variation of envelopment’. Rommel at Gazala was a good example as was Genghis Khan at the Battle of the Indus.
In the Australian Army`s MLW 1.1.9 Campaigning 1996[Interim] 'Manoeuvre is the means of concentrating combat power to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, moral dominance and inflict destruction, if possible ....... . Manoeuvring forces may achieve their principal effect by the surprise or speed of their arrival, or the avenue of their approach'. In their article Dissecting Manoeuvre Lieutenant Colonels Corke and Kelly tell us that 'Manoeuvre warfare is a mental approach to a conflict in which we seek to create a rapidly and continually changing situation in which our enemy cannot effectively cope. To disrupt and dislocate'.
I am sure that they are all quite correct for much has been written about this 'new' Manoeuvre Theory of Warfare. But the Art of War has always been to put the enemy off balance; to out manoeuvre him; and, to surprise him. Mobility, firepower and quick decision making is what we were always trying to achieve. Just because we can now do it faster, further and with more firepower is no reason to confuse the issue.
Liddell Hart says that 'the purpose of national strategy is not so much to seek battle but to seek a situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuance by battle will do so', but if like Julius Caesar you have crossed the Rubicon, what was your Aim of War. Sun Tzu, who did not wish to fight unless forced to do so, said 'What is valued in war is victory, not prolonged operations'. In the days of the condoterri, circa 15th Century, 'Wars were for the main part intricate manoeuvres, sometimes concluded when one army found itself in such an unfavourable situation that victory would be extremely unlikely’. [Encyclopaedia of Military History] These wars were somewhat bloodless, the disadvantaged side preferring to concede rather than waste expensive manpower and equipment.
Clausewitz was for 'absolute war' and 'annihilation' while Roosevelt in World War 2 war was for unconditional surrender. At the moment the swinging pendulum points to a negotiated cease fire with ‘peace’ to follow. Is this a swing back to the pre-Napoleonic era?Of course by the time you read this it may have all changed again.
In years past it was a requirement to study military history at officer producing establishments, staff colleges and to qualify for further promotion. There are no longer any promotion exams and military history as a subject is no longer taught at places such as the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Royal Military College Duntroon or the Command and Staff College
.If we do not study history we will make the same mistakes again.
Brigadier Brian H. Cooper [Retired]
