Day One

On 8 November 2004, having received orders from CO JHF(I), one AAC Lynx Mk 9 and an RAF Puma departed Basra to provide support to the 1st Battalion The Black Watch (1BW) based in Camp Dogwood near Fallujah. The widely reported deployment of 1BW had already seen five fatalities and there were few illusions within the JHF(I) Detachment about the task that lay ahead. After a refuel enroute, the aircraft, designated Eagle Formation, landed at the USMC Forward Operating Base, Kalsu. It was from here that the aviation support would be based.

From right: Captain Watkins (now Major) and crew

A JHF(I) reconnaissance two days earlier had determined that Camp Dogwood lacked the basic infrastructure to support an aviation detachment and as a result the aircraft would forward mount to Dogwood on a daily basis. Operating in a new area meant receiving a brief from the British Aviation Liaison Officer at Kalsu on the latest intelligence and procedures for working in the American AO. Once briefed the formation departed for Dogwood. Our arrival at Dogwood proved to be a forerunner of things to come. As we circled the camp at midday, we saw a number of 1BW soldiers greeting us, some waving with excitement and no doubt pleased to see us. In the minute or two it took to land, these soldiers were no where to be seen. Unknown to us, the camp had come under rocket attack just as both aircraft were landing at the Dogwood Helicopter Landing Site (HLS).

Communications with the American controllers at Dogwood had been non existent on the way in and it was only through the presence of mind of the 652 Sqn AAC Sergeant Major who ran out to our aircraft to let us know of the danger that we learned of the attack. Both aircraft quickly lifted from the HLS and commenced a systematic search of an area east of Dogwood and the Euphrates River. Unfortunately, there were no signs of a launch site and nothing was found. On returning to Dogwood we made every effort to sort out the communication difficulties before the next task, eventually arriving at a workable solution.

The task that followed was a trooping and re-supply sortie to Baghdad. Our first trip to Baghdad was completed without any hint of the potential hostility and was followed by our return to Kalsu in the evening. At Kalsu, the Americans proved to be great hosts and were enormously obliging. Despite the basic yet comfortable accommodation the cookhouse was a great source of morale for our boys and girls. As for the USMC helicopter crews and engineers, their assistance and willingness to help in any way could not be overstated. There is little doubt that our mission could not have been achieved without them.

Day two saw the formation land at Dogwood at 0800hrs. 1BW had established a company position to the east of the Euphrates River in the infamous Elf ammunition storage facility (nicknamed Springwood). Re-supplying this company would become one of the features of the aviation support during Op BRACKEN and the first of these re-supplies took place that morning, a day which turned out to be the quietest day during my time in Dogwood.

We’re Hit!

November 10, the USMC birthday. The day started with an early rise to deliver a 1BW piper to play at the birthday celebrations to be held at Kalsu. It was a gesture of thanks from CO 1BW which was greatly appreciated by the Americans. After delivering the piper, the formation flew back to Dogwood to prepare for a busy day’s flying. The first task was simple enough; it was another sortie to deliver stores and personnel from Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) to Dogwood. Given the amount of personnel and equipment it became obvious that two or possibly three round trips would be required to deliver everything to Dogwood.

Departing at 1000 hrs, the formation flew low level to an eastern Visual Reporting Point (VRP) before tracking direct to the airfield. This was the third time in as many days that we had tracked via this point and even though the formation had taken varying routes to this position, pattern setting was starting to become a concern. On return to Dogwood, the Lynx required a rotors turning refuel in order to complete the task. It was during the refuel that the navigator from the Puma suggested that the next run into BIAP should be via a western VRP that we had not used before. As the formation commander, I agreed that this was a good idea and tasked the Puma to lead the formation on the next run into BIAP.

Both aircraft lifted for Baghdad at approximately 1100 hrs and proceeded direct for the western VRP. This put us on a heading of due north out of Dogwood. All appeared normal as we crossed the Euphrates River into the semi rural and fertile land that covers that area. The Lynx sat 300m to 400m to the right rear of the Puma, maintaining a freedom of arc in that position. 120 knots at 50 ft above ground level was the standard profile maintained as we closed with the western VRP. The VHF radio was the primary means of communication between the two aircraft, with the 1BW command net as the backup set on the tactical radio. The VHF frequency used was also monitored by our aviation operations personnel in Dogwood. With the VRP only a minute or two away, the Lynx was rocked by the impact of small arms fire on the right side of the aircraft and in the cockpit, all hell broke loose.

A large explosion was heard as a 7.62mm round smashed its way through the pilot’s door Perspex window. Debris in the form of what can only be described as a fine mist, appeared instantly in front of my pilot, Captain Keith Reesby in the right seat and then disappeared just as quickly. The smell of cordite pervaded and then there was the yell of pain that immediately followed and the realisation that one of the crew had been shot. It is a sound that I will not soon forget.

Despite media reports to the contrary, I was already on the controls at the time of the contact, having decided to do a bit of flying on departure from Dogwood. On hearing the bullet burst into the cockpit, I was able to rapidly roll the aircraft to the left having initially believed the round had come through the floor. As we banked left, I screamed over the VHF radio “We’re hit, we’re hit!”, but there was no response from the Puma as it continued north.

Much to our collective relief, aviation operations in Dogwood had heard the transmission and acknowledged my call. As we continued to turn and track away from the firing point back towards the south, Keith let us know he’d been shot. Dinger, our Air Door Gunner in the back, had already made ready on the GPMG and was preparing to engage the firing point as he observed it pass through the 6 to 7 o’clock position of the aircraft as it turned. Unfortunately, before he could get the three men who had shot at us within the traverse of the gun, I had started to roll the aircraft in the opposite direction.

He did advise me that he could now see the shooters but the time had now passed for shooting back and Dinger was instructed to help Keith by passing him field dressings. I have often been asked at this point whether I was afraid. I can honestly say that I do not recall being afraid at that time but no doubt I was. However, in terms of a recognisable emotion, it was not fear but guilt I first felt. We had completely lost all contact with the Puma in a very hostile environment and it was now without mutual support.

The thought of turning to try and catch the Puma entered my mind but was quickly dismissed. Unknown to us, the Puma had changed frequency on the VHF radio to talk to BIAP Tower on approaching the VRP. They called the change in frequency but it was never heard by us. In the moments before we were hit, the Puma crew thought they were being fired upon from the right side of their aircraft. This would explain how the shooters got the lead they needed to hit the Lynx as we passed them. Continuing south, it wasn’t long before we were crossing the Euphrates River again. The immediate priority was to get over the desert which lay a few hundred metres south of the river. While the aircraft was performing as expected and all indications were normal up until this point, we couldn’t be sure that she was going to keep flying. The desert represented a relatively safe location to put down should the need suddenly arise. By the grace of God, it didn’t. Once over the desert, we turned to track direct for Dogwood.

By now Keith was asking for a third field dressing after realising his injuries were greater than he had initially thought. The radio calls continued, mainly trying to contact the Puma on all the available nets but also included the passing of a brief contact report to 1BW.

As Dogwood loomed in the distance, the Puma finally made contact and advised us of their intension to return to base. The landing at the Dogwood HLS was somewhat uneventful, though a request had been made to land at the medical HLS. This was denied as I was unfamiliar with that HLS at this early stage and the main HLS represented a safer option. Once on the ground, the aircraft was rolled to a stop with a bit of interesting cross cockpit brake application (the Mark 9 Lynx has only one brake lever which is located on the right side cyclic).

After a rapid shutdown, Keith started to pull himself out of his seat. He was almost all the way out by the time Dinger and I got to him. Despite his wounds, he had remained calm throughout the whole ordeal, never panicking, and communicated with us regularly as he methodically dressed his own wounds. His calm and collected disposition significantly reduced the burden on the crew as we raced to get him to Dogwood.

Assistance came quickly in the form of our aviation operations personnel and the RAF refuellers. They raced to the front of the aircraft where Keith was now sitting and soon had him in an ambulance and off to the 1BW Regimental Aid Post. Within 15 minutes he was in an American Army Blackhawk medevac helicopter and would arrive at a Baghdad hospital in less than an hour after the actual shooting.

In the meantime, the Puma had landed safely and I was in the 1BW operations room giving details of the contact. It wasn’t long before our Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (REME) personnel started the damage assessment on the aircraft. Seven holes were found in the airframe, which were caused by three 7.62mm rounds. One bullet had entered the cockpit through the pilot’s perspex window and subsequently struck Keith. A second round had passed into the belly of the aircraft from the right side just under the pilot’s seat, hitting my collective link before ricocheting out through the belly of the aircraft just forward of the nose wheel. The third round passed through both Infra Red Counter Measure ducts located just aft of the engines.

Damaged collective link

As it turned out, the day was far from over. A Royal Military Police (RMP) Sergeant had requested to photograph the damage to the aircraft for investigation purposes so I arranged to meet him and SSgt Hutson, our senior REME engineer at the aircraft just after lunch. For ease, all three of us removed our body armour to crawl over the aircraft and take the requisite photos. Just as we were completing the task, we heard the distinct sound of a 107mm rocket pushing through the air. With our body armour out of reach, we crawled to take shelter under the nearest available cover, the Lynx.

We heard several rounds incoming and one in particular that seemed to take an eternity to land. When it did, it was close. The shrapnel from this round struck the aircraft and before we knew it, the right side hydraulic reservoir had emptied its contents on the ground. If there were any doubts about the airworthiness of the Lynx before that moment, they were clarified in that instant. Not only had the shrapnel severed a hydraulic line but it also cut through a vital control rod and damaged a hydraulic pump. This aircraft wasn’t going anywhere!

A second rocket attack later that day was a fitting end to an extraordinary day. This time they missed the aircraft though a piece of shrapnel did wound one of the 1BW soldiers while he was on the phone to his girlfriend. Fortunately, it was only a minor wound and he was OK. Last light saw us return back to Kalsu in the back of the Puma whilst a replacement Lynx was flown up from Basra and our crew reconstituted with another pilot. Remembrance Day, 2004 held renewed significance for those on Op BRACKEN as it did for many others in various areas of operations. This day also taught me the value of getting ‘back on the horse’.

I would be lying if I said the previous day’s events had had no effect on me or Dinger. Though we did not speak about it for months afterwards, we both experienced a niggling reluctance to get back in the saddle. Fortunately, we did not have the time to dwell on our experiences and found ourselves back in the air, moving on, all the wiser for the experience.

Contact.. Again? It was now Friday, 12 November. The previous day had proved somewhat frustrating after identifying and then losing a vehicle and two individuals at what was almost certainly an observation post looking on to Dogwood. Thankfully, things were about to turn around. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) was to visit again and the first task of the day was to deliver him to Kalsu.

Airspace restrictions imposed by the Americans prevented the more direct tracking from BIAP to Kalsu and so the formation was required to fly further south over towards Dogwood before turning to track direct. The Lynx carried the GOC and one member from his close protection team while the remainder of his party travelled in the Puma. As the formation passed close to Dogwood, 1BW tasked us to investigate suspicious activity east of the Euphrates River.

Remaining at 2000 ft in overwatch, I pushed the Puma low to investigate what was believed to be an illegal Vehicle Check Point (VCP). At approximately 1045 hrs, during the first pass over the area, the Puma was engaged from the VCP and it quickly broke clear of the area to the south. A contact report was passed to 1BW as we remained in overwatch and the Puma held to the south. The Puma’s pass had caused the VCP to collapse with three vehicles travelling south, east and west respectively.

We followed a dark coloured sedan east from the nearby intersection (known as Nick 99 by 1BW) as it drove into a nearby cemetery. It was now 1059 hrs. Three men were observed getting out of the vehicle and they proceeded to shoot up at the Lynx with AK-47 rifles. Dinger observed and called tracer passing within 50m to the rear and side of the aircraft. I was unsighted on the three men but with an obvious threat to the aircraft, Dinger returned fire with his GPMG. He fired 12 rounds at the three men, which landed in close proximity to them and their vehicle. The net effect was that it caused the three men to stop firing at us and return to their vehicle.

Dinger did observe more tracer shortly afterwards but by this stage the car was starting to drive out of the cemetery and I believed it no longer posed a threat. Hence, when Dinger prepared to re-engage, I had to prevent him from doing so based on our rules of engagement. We continued to follow the vehicle as it departed the cemetery and drove west towards an area known as Millionaires Row. The car was observed stopping at two houses in this area which we reported to 1BW.

During our engagement, the Puma had returned to Dogwood to refuel and check for damage. Upon its return on task a handover was initiated between the two aircraft to continue surveillance of the area. Later that day, it was discovered that the Lynx had sustained damage during the contact with a round penetrating the rear avionics bay. Orbiting at 2000 ft at 100 knots had meant the round had lost a lot of inertia when it hit the aircraft which limited the damage but still proved you can get hit at the top of the threat band by small arms!

The return to Dogwood for the refuel saw CO 1BW approach the aircraft to speak directly with the GOC. Both had agreed to continue with the use of aviation assets to help support the developing situation. After the refuel, we departed Dogwood again but this time with both the GOC and CO 1BW onboard. A brave move on their behalf, considering the heat we had attracted over the last two days.

With the Puma crew continuing to observe the area where the dark coloured sedan had stopped, the Lynx moved to help find the other two vehicles. One of these vehicles was a silver coloured Opel sedan. This car was seen shortly after the Lynx arrived back on station by a 1BW callsign. It wasn’t long before we were able to acquire the target vehicle as it followed the western bank of the Euphrates River and then turned into a large compound.

From the air, CO 1BW coordinated his Warrior call signs to move into this location. This was the first time I had seen a ground element commander conduct such an operation from the air. As a platform, the Lynx served this purpose well and the overall operation proved to be a great success. The CO only remained airborne until his Warrior callsigns were established in their positions at the compound. Once this had occurred, he was returned to Dogwood along with the GOC to monitor the situation from his operations room.

We however, returned to provide overwatch to the 1BW callsigns which had now started speaking to people from in and around the buildings in the compound. The complex was eventually determined to be a mosque and the 1BW soldiers discovered a number of items in the car that could be used to make an improvised explosive device (IED) including circuit boards and transmitters. Two 155mm shells were also found discarded at the entrance to the mosque. We were to fly two personnel arrested in connection with the silver Opel back to Dogwood for questioning as our final task on this particular operation. With his original program now in disarray, the GOC was flown back to BIAP later that afternoon before both aircraft recovered to Kalsu prior to last light.

The Final Days Our final two days would prove to be no less interesting but not quite as intense. Since 10 November, the battle-damaged Lynx had remained on the Dogwood HLS and the opportunity to move it came on the morning of Saturday, 13 November. An RAF Chinook from JHF(I) had flown up the evening before in preparation to move the aircraft to an American airfield not far from Fallujah. Eagle Formation was tasked with escorting the Chinook to the airfield, however an unserviceability on start saw our Lynx remain at Kalsu for part of the morning while the Puma carried out the escort duties. By the time this task was complete our aircraft was serviceable and both the Puma and Lynx were quickly reunited at Dogwood.

Eagle VCPs were next on the agenda. These were carried out in close proximity to Dogwood with the Lynx providing top cover as the Puma dropped the airborne reaction force (ARF) on the main roads to carry out the VCP. A number of vehicles did try to avoid the check points but all were stopped by either repositioning the VCP or by utilizing the Lynx to block the escaping vehicle. Whilst this proved to be a valuable exercise, nothing was found in the stopped vehicles.

On returning to Dogwood, a 1BW callsign to the north of Dogwood was engaged by indirect fire. A suspicious individual was observed by the 1BW callsign and thought to be spotting for the attack. The Lynx had just completed refueling when the formation was tasked to find the suspicious individual. The Puma still had the members of the VCP onboard and these personnel were to remain on the aircraft as an ARF.

The formation arrived over the area of interest within minutes of the attack and during a low level search identified a man fitting the description of the suspicious individual. He was located on the edge of the Euphrates River with a number of other people, some 400m from where he was first observed. As we climbed into an overwatch position, we observed the group of people scatter into three nearby farmhouses. Grids for these farmhouses were passed to 1BW as a major search operation swung into action.

The ARF was dropped near the first house and started to sweep through as Warriors arrived on the scene. Much of the movement of ground call signs was facilitated by both Eagle callsigns. The Puma concentrated on communications with the ARF and the Lynx concentrated on communications with the mechanised callsigns and 1BW HQ. Both aircraft remained overhead for some 90 minutes before returning to Dogwood.

Our final day consisted predominately of resupplying the 1BW company at Springfield. However, of some significance was a photograph taken on my digital camera during the return leg of the first re-supply sortie. The callsign was tasked whilst airborne to photograph a bridge nicknamed Bart that lay over a tributary close to the Euphrates River. Upon landing at Dogwood the photographs were presented to the 1BW HQ. Orders for Op HOOK were to be given later that morning by CO 1BW, however the photos of Bart revealed vital information about the bridge that prevented the operation continuing.

As a result, the operation was delayed and significantly modified. This one incident was to demonstrate the value of carrying digital cameras in our aircraft. I left Dogwood for the last time that evening to greet the replacement Lynx crew at Kalsu and start the handover. Once this was completed, we started the long trip home to Basra.

In the seven days I was there, I flew over 26 hours in the Lynx, came under rocket attack on four separate occasions and had two aircraft damaged by hostile action. I saw a good mate wounded but gained some sense of redemption when we returned fire two days later. I returned to Basra exhausted but content with what we had achieved. It was my great privilege to have served with 1BW on Op BRACKEN and to have been able to contribute as we did.

End