Dear Editor,

I would like to take this opportunity to rebut the quaint views expressed by Chickenhawk in the Feb 05 issue of Fourays.  Like many other readers of Chickenhawk's article I was curious about the authors background and experience. One can only assume the courage of his convictions did not extend to providing this information.  However, neither his rank, his time in service or his experience matter.  His credibility will stand based solely on the views he expressed in his article  "Can we put the Army back in Army Aviation".

I am a little uncertain on how Chickenhawk views current army pilots.  On the one hand he states: "All this predisposes that the new army crews would be trained to a level that they could talk on equal terms with the people they were supporting, have personal experience in the operations that those people were in, and would be highly motivated towards the job they were doing.  No doubt they are."  Perhaps his last remark is provided tongue in cheek given that he goes on to say rapid promotion to meet our expansion has meant that many at all levels do not have the same command experience and training as other arms officers receive. 

I can only assume Chickenhawk believes current army aviation officers have limited training and cannot adequately operate in an combined arms team.  Sadly, for Chickenhawk that is, the reality is somewhat different.   Current army aviation officers conduct all the combat arms training their peers conduct, Grade 3 (ISC), Combat Officers Advance Course (COAC) and Grade 2 (IOC) prior to promotion to MAJ, followed by Grade 1 (C & SC).  It may suprise Chickenhawk that many aviation officers do very well on these courses.  Army aviators are promoted no faster than officers of other Corps.  Furthermore, Army pilots achieve the same command experience through the usual cycle of Tp COMD followed by Sqn COMD followed By Regt COMD.  Further appointments may enhance leadership skills, such as ADJT, Sqn/Regt 2ic etc.

As Chickenhawk has stated, since Korea most battles fought have been on a sub unit scale.  It appears he is questioning current technology trends within the ADF, current training paradigms and the current doctrine associated with conventional warfighting.  The questions and points he raises with respect to size and composition of future enemy, symmetric versus asymmetric warfare, training and equipment and technology issues have all been addressed in LWD 1 - The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2002.
LWD 1 is the army's keystone doctrine around which it shapes all other doctrine.  Might I suggest Chickenhawk read current doctrine to obtain an insight on what the army mission is and how the army achieves its mission.

Chickenhawk asks how much useful support will we provide the battalion or company commander?  I can only ask Chickenhawk to review LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics and LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics to understand that Army Aviation is an arms Corps and integral to the combined arms team.  He may also wish to review the Battlespace Operating System and understand how army aviation may be viewed as "multi-BOS".  The concept and relevancy of army aviation being viewed as a "support arm" changed in the late 1980's and early 1990's and was no doubt reinforced with the success of army aviation (US) in Gulf War 1.

Finally, I would like to address Chickenhawks assertion The decision that the front seater in Tiger must be an officer pilot is extraordinary.  The implication being that OR's no longer have an avenue to achieve aircrew pilot status.  I shan't argue the merits or otherwise of NCO versus Warrant Officer (US army) aircrew versus the SSO scheme.  That battle has been fought and decided.  However, soldiers and NCO's have every opportunity to become pilot aircrew and can apply in there units via a form PE063.  I would like to add that if a dual streaming process was adopted, there would be a real difficulty, in our current paradigm, in developing Battle Captains and providing a meaningful career stream for pilots.  Solving one problem often creates a multitude of others.  Finally, having flown with many Observers (a quick perusal of my log book indicates at least fifteen badged Observers) I would like to say that the proposition that Observers have equal skills, including flying, to a trained army pilot is preposterous.  The skills of an Observer was unique and they were very good and professional at what they did.  But they did not receive the training or development to equal that of an army pilot.

I hope I have adequately refuted some of Chickenhawk's archaic views.  I can assure him that Army has never left "Army aviation".  We are better trained, more professional and have now become a combat arm integral to the combined arms team.

J.S. LACEY
Capt.

QFI, 161 Recce Sqn

The Door Gunner Takes Aim