By
O.M. Eather
Notes and References
To return to the main body of the article, use your browser's BACK button.
Notes
i. This is vastly different to the para-professional bias of current RAAF training where technical and process proficiency has come to mask any depth or rigour of theoretical understanding of the conduct of War. Interestingly, neither of the authors of 'The Leading Edge' despite their seniority, have active service. The Distinguished Flying Cross awarded to one was for 'services to training.'
ii. It was the awareness of this employment of Air Power that Montgomery referred to when he identified Air as a significant development in warfare, and not as a separate, disjointed service pursuing its own vision of operations remote from the only decisive activity in war, the land battle. He had little confidence in the higher direction of the Allied Air Forces before D Day in 1944 as 'the air forces simply failed to see what practical help they could give the Army.' Lord Alanbrooke describes Air Marshal Harris telling the 'Overlord' briefing how the RAF might have won the war if it had not been for the handicap imposed by the existence of the other two services.' (6. pp.582 & 599.)
iii. Moreshead describes the unity of the 'steady rhythm of the German attack - first the Stukas, then the artillery, then the infantry, then the tanks, then the Stukas following up again.'
iv. Compare Douhet's 'Command of the air means victory' and 'vital centres' with 'Air Power is the key to Australia's defence', Air Power . . . able to provide victory on its own account' and 'centres of gravity' and 'vital elements.'
v. Latin: Delayer - after Quintus Fabius Maximus, the Roman general who artfully avoided combat for several years with Hannibal's Carthaginian forces after they had lodged an incursion on the Italian mainland.
vi. In the Gulf War, of the 1305 combat aircraft fielded by the Coalition air forces, excluding rotary wing, the percentage of specialist Close Air Support aircraft was just over fifteen per cent, not an inordinate diversion of Air Control and Bombardment resources. The US Army/USAF 'Joint Attack Team' concept employing A10 aircraft and AH64 Apache helicopters was tested successfully, the Apaches being used to clear a safe corridor for strike aircraft into Iraq.
To return to the main body of the article, use your browser's BACK button.
Ref 1. 'The Defence of Australia. 1987', Department of Defence.
Ref 2. 'Agreement between the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) (on) ... operation of Army aircraft' p.3, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), October, 1990; 29, pp.78-82.
Ref 3. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), October, 1990, p. 113; 7, p.54. '. . . Australia's very advanced strike forces .. . are unlikely to be appropriate (in) coping with the low level contingencies.' p. 105, '. . . F- 111 and F/A 18 ... are twice as expensive to operate as the older Mirages . . .'; 29, p.203.
Ref 4. 15, 'The chief of the Air Staff ... proposed that the Officers undertake research into . . . air power doctrine ... for Australia's needs'. 'The Terms of Reference were given by the Chief of the Air Staff for the book.'
Ref 8. 17, p.7; 15, 'Roles and Missions', pp.84-85; No mention is made of either 'Close Air' or 'Battlefield' support for ADF air power assets. 'Force Structure: an Air Force View', Air Commodore N. Ashworth, APDR, September, 1990.
Ref 10. 18, p. 165; 15, p. 187, 'Air power is the key to Australia's defence . . .' and p. 166 '. . . doctrine must clearly establish priorities ... which will enable the RAAF to be employed in a manner which will permit optimum force projection. . .'
Ref 11. 5, p. 16, and 15, pp. 103-104, quoting the CAS, '. . . our air crew (will) stand outside the range of an opponent's defences as they send in multiple, difficult to detect, very accurate weapons against targets of real importance to his war effort.' (The tone of this statement echoes that of the American general in 1938). Also, p.160, '. . . the predominant role air power should play in the defence of the nation into the foreseeable future.'; 29, p.32.
Ref 15. 18, pp.9-12; pp.53-55.
Ref 17. 18, p.47, p.87, p. 108, p. 128, p. 133, p. 143.
Ref 19. 18, pp. 154-159; 10, pp. 1460-1463.
Ref 24. 6, pp.173, 600; 8, p-525. ('... in the end all wars become a confrontation between infantry - and the training of this infantry, its ability to move with cohesion, and to cooperate with artillery, tanks, engineers and aircraft, would determine the outcome.')
Ref 35. 21, pp.587-598~ 29, pp.62-68; 30, pp.357, 361
Ref 38. 14, pp. 114, 241-242,541; 27, pp.22-23, 31.
Ref 39. 14, pp.781-783; 27, pp.81, 126.
41. 1, pp16-18, 68-69, 72-73, 83-87; 28, pp.14. 30-31, 45. Department of Air Organisation Directive 9/66, 18 April 1966, stated in part, ' No 9 Squadron is to lift troops from a secure staging area to a landing zone that is relatively secure and where enemy resistance is not expected.'
Ref 42. 'Selecting an Australian Tactical Fighter Force; Marginal Strategies, Rationality and the Australian Aircraft Industry', Kevin J. Foley - from 'The Future of Tactical Air Power in the Defence of Australia', editor, D. Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1977. (Foley describes the fighter selection process as a 'long succession or loosely structured ad hoe decisions' and that it, from his observation, 'lacks coherence and ... resembles disjointed incrementalism.')
Ref 43. 25; a, par. 54, 105; c, par. 54, 153; a, par. 35, 40, 105; b, par' 102, 153; c, par. 17, 18; e, par. 3313-3315. An example of reciprocal understanding of land operations by RAAF Comd Air West, and one that is typical of the cursory knowledge of ground operations held by RAAF flyers of the present generation, is contained in his report when he suggests 'try some air- ground tactics . . . for example, surrounding a suspected enemy concentration, attacking with the aim to destroy, confuse or frighten, then move in or wait to catch them as they move out ... " The writer wonders who would end up being confused and frightened!
Ref 45. 13, pp.31-33, 37, 41, 50, 85, 90, 98-99, 124, 166, 175-177,187, 201, 233; 15, pp.33, 73, 104, 144, 136, 163.
Ref 46. 17, p. 17; 27, pp.7-9, 19.
Ref 47. 'AirLand Battle Future -The Tactical Battlefield', Maj Gen S. Silvasy Jr, US Army Military Review, February, 1991; 31, p. 1, pp. 10- 15, p.75, pp.200-20 1.
Ref 48. 'Desert Storm Air War Analysis', C. Kopp, Australian Aviation, April 1991; 'After the Storm - Special Report', Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 April, 1991.
Ref 49. 3, pp. 87-88; 7, pp.39,54,70, 89.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
'The Battle of Long Tan', L, McAulay, Hutchinson, 1986.
'Australia's Defence; White Paper in the Red', G. Cheeseman, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 2, August 1990.
'Rethinking Australia's Defence', R. Babbage, University of Queensland Press, 1980.
'South-West Pacific Area - First Year', D. McCarthy, Australian War Memorial, 1959.
'Eagle Against The Sun', R.H. Spector, Free Press (MacMillan), 1984.
'Montgomery, Master of the Battlefield, 1942-44', N. Hamilton, Hamish Hamilton, 1983.
'A Coast Too Long', R. Babbage, Allen & Unwin, 1990.
'A History of Warfare', Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Collins, 1968.
'Blitzkrieg', B. Pin, Purnell, 1972 (History of the Second World War).
'Kursk: The Clash of Armour', G.A. Koltunov, Purnell, 1972 (History of the Second World War).
'The Moscow Counterblow, the Russian View', G.K. Zhukov, Purnell, 1972 (History of the Second World War).
'The Command of the Air', G. Douhet, 2nd Edition, Faber & Faber (English edition), 1940.
'Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Manual', AAP 1000.
'A Bright Shining Lie', N. Sheehan, Johnathon Cape, London, 1989.
"The Leading Edge', P.J. Criss and D.J. Schubert, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence number 62, Australian National University, 1990.
"The International Encyclopedia of Aviation', Octopus Books, 1977.
'Air Power in the Nuclear Age', M.J. Armitage and R.A. Mason, University of Illinois Press, 1985.
'German Air Force operations in Support of the Army', P. Deichman, USAF Historical Division, Air University, Amo Press, 1962.
'African Trilogy', A. Morehead, Hamish Hamilton, 1944.
"The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945', Air Minis", United Kingdom, 1948.
'Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942', Douglas Gillison, 1962, Australian War Memorial.
Infantry Training, Volume IV, 'The Battalion', 1967, Australian Army.
'The Restless Organisation', J.W. Hunt, John Wiley & Sons, 1972.
'Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War'. D.M. Horner, Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986.
Post Exercise Reports - K 83
a. Commander Westforce, HQ Operational Command, RAAF, 22 Nov 83.
b. Maritime Commanders Report, HM Australian Fleet HQ, Garden Island, 4 Nov 83.
c. Land Component, HQ 3 Brigade, 28 Oct 83.
d. Commander, Air West, 22 Nov 83.
e. Exercise Director-, Report (K83/27/15/JEPS), 22 Dec 83.
Exercise Kangaroo 86, 3 Brigade Post Ex Rep (R841-21-22), Laverack Barracks, 5 Dec 86.
'Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam', D.J. Mrozek, Aerospace Education Foundation, Air Force Association, Pergamon Press, New York, 1989.
'Mission Vietnam, Royal Australian Air Force Operations, 19641972', G. Odgers, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1974.
'Power Plus Attitude', A. Stephens, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992.
"High Command', D.M. Horner, George Allen & Unwin, 1982.
'Defeat in the East - the Mark of Mao Tse Tung on War', M. Elliot -- Bateman, Oxford University Press, 1967.
To return to the main body of the article, use your browser's BACK button.
The original article was written in 1992. Since then we've seen various incursions and incidents in the MIddle East, Bosnia and more recently the War Against Terrorism. These have tended to support the propositions made in this paper rather than lessen them. This addendum has subsequently been added by the editorial committee.
AD1. Operation Enduring Freedom - Operation Anaconda. In April 2002 an attempted encirclement of Taliban and El Queda forces failed to achieve the aim of detroying all enemy forces. Post action analysis indicates that a significant number of enemy managed to escape across the Afghan border into Pakistan. One of the major lessons of this operation was the problem of Command and Control - with a significant amount of tactical decision making being carried out in the United States rather than by the commanders on the ground. This "second guessing" was brought about by the assumption that modern communictions and computer technology, made the physical location of the "combat" HQ irrelevent. Instead it was demonstrated that by splitting command in this fashion, the ground commander was deprived of flexible and speedy decision making which then restricted his ability to co-ordinate air and ground assetts. In some ways the situation was reminiscent of the philosophy applied by the RAAF in South Vietnam where tactical decisions concerning the use of supporting 9 Squadron Hueys were often referred to Vung Tau - and even back to Operational Command in Australia.
AD2. It is noteworthy to consider 9 Squadron's ongoing refusal to base aircraft at Nui Dat. This even went to the extent of the RAAF withdrawing their medivac stand-by to Vung Tau at 1600hrs, to be replaced by a US Army 'Dustoff" which would remain at TFHQ overnight - a point not lost on Australian soldiers based at Nui Dat. Vung Tau was for the duration of the war, a leave destination for 1 ATF. With its bars and brothels doing brisk business, it was a sore point with many soldiers who had to endure the isolation of Nui Dat. The morale implications of such a decision have been detrimental to those good services that 9 Squadron eventually provided.
AD3. 9 Squadron's flight statistics have been skewed by the fact that, being based at Vung Tau, some 25 mins or so flight time from the Task Force base at Nui Dat, transit to and from 1ATF have been counted as "operational" or "combat" sorties. Irrespective of whether the aircraft participated in action supporting the task force on any given day, two "operational" sorties were logged for each aircraft. There was no logical reason, operationally or tactically why several aircraft (or all aircraft) could not have been based forward at Nui Dat. The reasons given...(lack of service facilities...vulnerability to enemy fire) were all spurious excuses to minimise army control of RAAF assets - at the expense of operational effectiveness - and at times - Australian lives. (Manson...Number Nine, the Squadron That Died of Shame)
Home. Returns you to the FOURAYS main index
