Part 5

Accepting that the Close Air Support gap exists, what are relevant factors affecting its solution and what is a possible shape of the practical application of possible solutions? Current RAAF doctrine is built around:

a. Fixed Base dependence.

b. Emphasis on the Sea Air Gap and the consequent irrelevance of the land battle.

c. Absolute primacy of the Control of the Air Campaign and the Air Offensive (the Strategic Role Conception).

d. Procurement of costly platforms suited to the Strategic Role.

e. Conservation of those costly platforms.

f. Command of those platforms at the highest level and control only by RAAF officers.

The real gap, as has been said, is between the FA/18 and the field howitzer. The RAAF is unlikely on past joint exercise performance, ever to fulfill the Close Air Support function which will be unquestionably subordinated to the Control of the Air campaign. Therefore a new Tactical Air Support Group (TASG) is required to fill this gap.

It is unlikely that much, if any, warning will be received of a determined and well planned incursion by an enemy onto the Australian mainland. The probability is that a low-level lodgement will be detected only after it is on the ground. (although improved surveillance techniques may minimise this) Penetration by fishing and "refugee" vessels is almost a weekly commonplace in Australia's northern approaches, and to properly monitor them would require more resources than currently available or planned. If all surveillance resources were utilised 'Positive identification rates would be ...5-20 per cent per crossing of the sea-air gap.' A wisely positioned lodging would preclude effective air strikes due to range limitations from the nine airfields capable of unrestricted RAAF operation in northern Australia. Moreover, there are almost three hundred airstrips in the same area that can support C130 Hercules aircraft and any one could become the lodgment point for a determined enemy. In such a situation 'Australia's very advanced strike forces ... are unlikely to be appropriate.' (Ref 49)

The Australian Army, left to mount a response to such a threat, would require certain characteristics of the Tactical Air Support Group supporting it. There would seem to be several fairly clear ones from the preceding discussion. The TASG should be:

a. Equipped with relatively cheap, rugged platforms that are easily replaced and maintained, with a useable payload, range and loiter times, and that can operate from the numerous C 130 class airstrips in northern Australia.

b. Deployable in small elements of a size appropriate to the ground force deployed and capable of locating with, or very close to, the supported force.

c. Commanded by a surface force officer, either Navy or Army, reporting directly to the ground force commander. The assets are coordinated by the ground force Fire Support Control Centre and can be requested by Fire Support Specialists with the combat elements.

d. Part of a joint surface force group exclusively committed to the development and training of assets for Close Air Support, particularly ground forces in the early stages.

Without going further into organisation structure, these characteristics would seem to be the guidelines that fill the Close Air Support gap and conform to the time tested principles for effectiveness in this role.

There are two concrete suggestions on the characteristics mentioned above. They are:

a. Fostering. The group and its development should be jointly fostered by the Australian Army's Aviation Corps and the appropriate sections of the Royal Australian Navy's Fleet Air Arm. Command should be rotated in turn between these two surface elements and operational units commanded by officers from these two Services.

b. Equipment. Fleet Air Arm Skyhawks are (were..ed) adequate, although not capable of operating from C130 fields. Army Aviation Iroquois or Blackhawk helicopters, modified for the gunship role would be the first step for ground forces. Indeed, Australian Blackhawks have strengthened cargo floors to enable the operation of multiple barrel weapons. As purely a stop gap, however, the GAF Nomad could be modified for the Close Air Support role, in spite of its shortcomings. This would cover the existing deficiency until more technically proficient aircraft could be acquired, probably through the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter - Air 87 programme for Army Aviation. For instance, a suitable and well proven type is the Cobra (the AH-1W model) that is readily available. Other suitable designs are now on the drawing board and will fly in the next few years. A quota of three per Regular Army battalion would seem a reasonable starting point, with a sixty per cent reserve factor.

This article has, it is hoped, laid the basis for examination of what is a serious deficiency in the capacity of the ADF to perform its function in the defence of Australia - particularly the capacity of the ground forces to prevail in the land battle. Examination of major themes in the history of Close Air Support and its evolution in the Australian context, may provide the basis for future and more specific debate on the provision of vital air assets to the surface commanders of the future.

The last words will be left to Field Marshal Montgomery. In his final magnum opus, 'A History of Warfare', the veteran commander made the ultimate expression of his long career on the subject of war. Montgomery certainly ascribed Air Power as having a 'profound impact', but no more so than Sea Power where the lesson was that the nation that 'had control of the seas, has in the end, prevailed.' He saw that the modem commander should use both to constrain the enemy to a land conflict, where a decisive battle can be fought. In fact, he ascribed the greatest significance for military success to a factor not reliant on technology at all; Morale, 'the most important single factor in war.' But on the subject of who determines the all important land battle, which is after all the foundation of this article, Monty was in no doubt:

'In spite of the magnificent part played in battle by aircraft, artillery and tanks, to my mind in modem war it is the infantry soldier who in the end plays the decisive part in the land battle. I believe it to be true, the most versatile of all arms, infantry, can operate in any weather, in any type of ground day or night. The infantry has to bear the main burden in battle.'

It is hoped this paper will help in the lightening of that burden and assist the infantry of the Australian Army to have the means to do their indispensable job.

O.M Eather, July 1992

About the Author

Owen Eather is a graduate of the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, and the Macquarie University Graduate School of Management, where he qualified as Master of Business Administration. He has also attended the Army Reserve Command and Staff College.

In the ARA Owen served with 1ATF, as Operations Officer of the TFMA during the 1968 Tet Offensive and later commanded a road transport unit. Post Vietnam he commanded a specialist army air transport unit and served on the staff of CTO, 2MD. His last A Res posting was at S02 level, 2Trg Gp. With a long interest in aviation, during his tour of Vietnam he flew many sorties with 161 Recce Flight, gaining an intimate knowledge of Australian Army Aviation operations. Using this experience he contributed to early papers on the use of Army Aviation in warfare, including "Unarmed into Battle (1971) - The Need to Arm Army Aircraft", and "Observers - Four Eyes are Better than Two." - a treatise for creating a specialist trade classification within Army Aviation. (1972)

Owen Eather is now a senior partner and owner of an international management consultancy that specialises in executive search and organisational dynamics in the South East Asian Region.