Part Two
Historical Trends
Even early theorists initially conceded that the application of air power was to assist the outcome of the decisive surface conflict. The doyen of air power, Trenchard, initially sought air superiority over the battlefield (Ref 9) until, with Mitchell and Douhet, the litany of 'massed bomber fleets' became dominant in the expounding of doctrine in the years between the world wars. The RAAF's current perception of itself is as a classic instrument of the tenets of Guido Douhet, in his 'Command of the Air', where the 'most effective form of operations' is ' the strategic offensive'.(Ref 10) These proponents of air power all focused on the bombardment firepower of strategic bomber fleets that would attack enemy 'vital centres' and opposing air forces. Such a form of warfare, they held, should relegate land and sea forces to the sidelines in resolving future wars; this became known as the putative 'Substitution' concept.
One American general even suggested 'high performance bombardment aircraft, together with reconnaissance planes of superior speed and range will suffice for the defence of the country.' (Ref 11) The thrust of debate, now emanating from the RAAF, albeit transposed to an Australian context sixty years later, has an eerie ring of this earlier struggle by northern hemisphere military aviators for their perception of recognition. One outcome of that earlier debate was that:
'Attack planes - light bombers and fighter-bombers for close air support - were almost ignored.'(Ref 12)
Germany
During this period one nation, Germany, after briefly pursuing grand strategic air power (Wever's 'Ural Bomber' project), (Ref 13) gained a different inspiration from the 'Expanding Torrent' theories of Liddell Hart whose ideas linked air power to the other radical weapon developed during WW1- the tank - and to the land battle as the decisive direction for its application. The result was the German military developed clear doctrines of air power that were meshed to winning the surface battle. The Luftwaffe was: ' independent but, nevertheless, harnessed to the Clausewitzian concept that the primary object in war was the destruction of the enemy's Armed Services.' (Ref 14)
Examining the Luftwaffe's development reveals sound principles of tactical air support that were later reflected by other air forces as they sought to emulate the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe's 'Blitzkrieg' techniques. From the outset and in spite of the pervasive influence of classical air theorists, the German High Command realised that technical limitations would always constrain air power from being the decisive arm. Rather, the Luftwaffe would always act in concert with the Wehrmacht, and to a lesser extent, the Kreigsmarine. Great attention was paid to cross training army officers and non-commissioned officers as observers in reconnaissance squadrons and, both in basic flying training and at the Air Command and Staff School, to train young flyers in ' the science of Army Tactics.' (Ref 15) This had the very real benefit of giving Air Force officers, particularly air crew, a proper military education grounded in an appreciation of those elements of their defence forces that were actually decisive.
From this realistic appreciation of operational needs, purpose designed aircraft for Army support were built and tested, finally proving their worth in the Spanish Civil War. Rugged and manoeuvrable, types such as the Heinkel 126, the Junkers 87 divebomber (the 'Stuka') and the Henschel 129 were never intended to take part in the air superiority battle, but instead to be part of the Army's means of extending and concentrating firepower at decisive points. Thereafter, although the Luftwaffe retained operational control of the majority of its aircraft, tactical reconnaissance, dive bomber and ground attack aircraft were effectively and permanently allocated to the ground commander. Fighters, particularly the Focke Wulfe 190, with its wide track undercarriage and tough air cooled engine, were switched to ground support roles when the enemy air threat had been neutralised by the attachment of bomb clips. The Domier 17 twin engined bomber, although designed for a strategic and interdiction role, was used for Army support due to its high speed.
Blitzkrieg - Lightning War
'Blitzkrieg' tactics depended on, firstly, applying overwhelming force at the breakthrough point and then, with air power, armour and artillery, bypassing strong points and paralysing the enemy's rear areas.(Ref 16) These tactics, spawned by Liddell-Hart's theories, but also a development of older Prussian Army doctrines of 'Envelopment' battles, thus incorporated the Luftwaffe into mainstream military operations. This avoided an imbalance of emphasis toward Air Superiority and Strategic Bombing theories that, in the latter case, ultimately proved sterile. The classic military dictums of Concentration and Surprise were exemplified and characterised in 'Blitzkrieg' operations by a 'piling up' of assets to ensure a result at the decisive point. Aircraft were merely another, albeit potent, means of applying force in the same category as Artillery or Armour.
Mobility, short flight times and immediate reaction were required from the Luftwaffe to match this new style of fluid warfare. This necessitated minimal reliance on fixed bases by operational squadrons and co-location of Luftwaffe and Army headquarters to maximise effectiveness by minimising chain-of-command decision time. Squadrons followed their Army units or the unfolding battle, 'lodging' with independent airfield companies who operated and prepared tactical airfields. Difficulties arose when 'Luftwaffe command units were not based forward' but improved when forward command and control elements moved with the ground combat units.
Ultimately, in Greece and Russia, liaison teams and forward observers were in the frontline, directing aircraft to targets nominated by the immediate infantry or artillery regimental commanders. Also, in Russia, the value of smaller units, two to three bomb carrying aircraft, was recognised in their greater flexibility, and manoeuvrability and that they could attend to targets too small for larger units.(Ref 17) The combined air and land forces of Germany were: 'Self contained. Stukas, tanks, recovery vehicles, petrol wagons, anti-tank gunners, all went forward together and their senior officers were often in the van.' (Ref 18)
The German General Staff calculated that, between 1939 and 1942, aircraft were employed in the ratio of 5:4 for Strategic as to Direct Support roles. This would include fighter and suitable bomber aircraft detached after the air superiority battle was won. However, the actual number of aircraft used for direct Army support was more modest and could not, at any time, have been considered an imbalance against the Luftwaffe's other missions. At the beginning of the French campaign, of 3,824 operational aircraft, there were 342 dive bombers, 42 ground attack and 501 reconnaissance. Similarly, in Russia, with 3,701 operational aircraft, 302 were dive bombers and 593 reconnaissance. However, close tactical support is always accompanied by high attrition in aircraft; if not in crews, due to aircraft being downed from low-level and mostly in reach of friendly forces. By the battle of Kursk, both the Germans and the Soviets had come to expect destruction to be almost equal amongst aircraft and tanks. The Red Army fielded 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft, the Germans, 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. So, whilst purpose designed close air support types have always been a small proportion of total air resources, in an intense surface battle, high levels of attrition of air assets, as well as armour and artillery, came to be expected and allowed for.(Ref 19)
The Luftwaffe was not merely an adjunct of the Wehrmacht. From the outset its doctrines were meshed to the theories of Douhet. Indeed, whilst those theories were seen as fundamental in defining the singularity of the service, the Luftwaffe contrived to be an effective mariner to reconcile the unique properties of airpower without ignoring the needs of the land battle or indulging in naive dismissal of surface forces as obsolete. The German Air Ministry field manual, 'The Conduct of Air Operations', which lay down doctrine, stated the overriding mission was to 'secure and maintain air superiority' and only then to provide 'combat and other air action supporting army forces on the ground'. The 'Air Field Manual No. 16' went further, stating the prime missions as 'strategic operations against sources of hostile military power' and 'attacks against targets in large cities.' (Ref 20) The Luftwaffe always figured about forty per cent of its strength would be bombers, twenty five to thirty per cent fighters, and the rest for the support of ground forces, including transport. Its first two phases of operations were to attack and destroy enemy air forces and aircraft factories and then ' vital centres'. But always included was the intention to aid the Army in its decisive engagements. For this reason, purpose built aircraft, such as the Junkers 87 divebomber,", were permanently under command of the Army to 'concentrate all striking power' with the service best able to judge its effective application in the land battle. (Ref 21)
Control of the Luftwaffe was always at the highest level with the Commander in Chief of the German High Command and, whilst there was general agreement that Air Superiority forces stayed under the command of the Luftwaffe, fighter units were assigned to Army control when circumstances justified such a change. In effect, they became specialist Army units and both services planned and trained for this as a normal part of operations. The Army local commander directed Luftwaffe units as he was best qualified to direct their activities, whilst in no way interfering with the technical command of Air units.(Ref 22) It is a common fallacy that the Luftwaffe was only ever the air arm of the German Army. Examination of its own doctrine refutes this. Its performance in gaining air superiority in Europe, from 1939 to at least 1943, and in the Western Desert up to the First Battle of El Alamein, and then its consistently determined defence of Germany against the Allied bomber offensive, gives the lie to such criticisms. But it never lost sight of the inescapable reality that, if ever it was to be credible, it must be part of the land battle. It took the Air Forces of its opponents several galling years to reach the same conclusion and to begin to copy the principles that the Luftwaffe had established for effective support of the Army.
The principles that the Luftwaffe experience showed to be successful in the Air Arm's support of the land battle can he now drawn. Those principles, for the use of air assets for Close Air Support, are:
a. Operational command by Ground Force Commander.
b. Forward location, preferably within. short flight time of in action combat elements.
c. Control by Air Arm personnel or fire support control specialists with leading combat elements.
d. Maximum and early use to assist in either breakup of aggressive enemy ground concentrations or, in assault, breakthrough with disabling concentration and surprise.
e. An irreducible proportion of specialist Close Air Support aircraft, organic to the Ground Force and commanded by it and not available (or suitable) for Control of the Air tasks.
f. Side-by-side location and direct command links between Ground and Air headquarters appropriate to the ground battle.
g. Flexible and forward deployment delinked from fixed bases through the use of independent airfield operating squadrons.
These principles all support the over-riding Clauswetzian assertion that destruction of the enemy force is the fundamental aim in battle. Adherence to these principles has determined the success or failure in the use of air assets in Close Air Support operations.
